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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v, 
LEE ALLEN AASE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 870276-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction of attempted second 
degree murder, a second degree felony, after a jury trial in the 
Second Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the court properly deny defendant's motion for 
a change of venue where defendant failed to demonstrate actual 
prejudice resulting from adverse pretrial publicity? 
2. Must this Court affirm the lower court's ruling on 
the admission of ammunition evidence where defendant did not 
present the specific objection he raises on appeal to the trial 
court? 
3. Must this Court refuse to review defendant's claim 
of an alleged violation of S 77-17-11 where defendant had failed 
to raise the issue at trial? 
4. Was defendant adequately notified that the offense 
was committed using a firearm where the probable cause statement 
in the information alleged that he shot the victim? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lee Allen Aase, was charged with attempted 
second degree murder, a second degree felony, under UTAH CODE 
ANN. SS 76-5-203 and 76-4-101 (1978 & Supp. 1987) (R. 60-64). 
After a jury trial, he was convicted of that offense (R. 261). 
The trial court sentenced him to the Utah State Prison for a term 
of one to fifteen years on the second degree felony conviction 
and a five year consecutive term for use of a firearm (R. 268-
69) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The issues raised by defendant on appeal generally do 
not require a recitation of facts beyond that contained in the 
Statement of the Case. Any additional factual development 
necessary to the resolution of the issues appears in the argument 
portion of this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's motion for a change of venue was properly 
denied prior to jury selection because it was premature. Where 
he failed to renew the objection after the court ruled that it 
was premature and failed to show that the jury was prejudiced by 
the allegedly prejudicial publicity he cannot prevail on appeal 
on his claim that the motion should have been granted. 
During trial, defendant objected to the admission of 
evidence that defendant had previously used ammunition similar to 
that used in the crime. Defendant did not, however, object upon 
the same grounds that he raises on appeal. Consequently, he 
waived the objection. 
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Defendant also failed to timely object to the fact that 
the jury was permitted to adjourn for lunch unaccompanied by the 
officer sworn to keep them together. He cannot raise this issue 
for the first time on appeal. 
Finally, defendant's contention that was not adequately 
notified in the information that the firearm enhancement 
provision applied to him is baseless. The probable cause 
statement included several references to the fact that the victim 
was "shot" with "bullets." These references were sufficient to 
notify defendant that a firearm was used in the crime. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ERRED IN DENYING HIS MOTION FOR A 
CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion for a change 
of venue (R. 95). Upon defendant's request for a ruling on that 
motion without a hearing (R. 120), the trial court denied it; 
however, it stated that the motion could "be renewed at the time 
of jury selection if a basis therefore [were] exhibited in the 
jury selection process" (R. 122). Defendant did not renew his 
venue motion at any time during or after jury selection, and 
specifically passed the jury for cause (Transcr. of May 7, 1987 
Proceedings at 4-80) . 
On appeal, defendant appears to argue that the pretrial 
publicity was so massive and prejudicial that it presumptively 
denied him an impartial jury, and thus the trial court erred in 
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refusing to grant a change of venue.1 
In claiming that a venue change was required, defendant 
makes no references to evidence of the pretrial publicity alleged 
to have been present in his case. Nor does he discuss in any 
detail the extent or quality of that publicity. In that the 
burden is on defendant to show that pretrial news coverage has 
generated community bias to such a degree that the right to a 
fair and impartial trial has been put in jeopardy, State v. Woody 
648 P.2d 71, 88 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Utah 
R. Crim. P. 29(e) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-29(e) (1982)), the 
Court should reject defendant's claim of error on the basis that 
he fails even to identify the publicity alleged to have been 
present. A bare allegation of prejudice is patently inadequate to 
justify a change of venue. Wood. 648 P.2d at 88 (citing State v* 
Gellatly. 22 Utah 2d 149, 449 P.2d 993 (1969)). 
Furthermore, it is clear that the mere demonstration 
that some dissemination of news, thought to be prejudicial to a 
defendant, has occurred does not normally entitle the defendant 
to prevail on a motion for a change of venue. Wood, 648 P.2d at 
89; State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338, 1349-50 (Utah 1977), cert-
denied. 439 U.S. 882 (1978). As noted in Wood: 
"The more general showing of publicity 
thought to be adverse to a party is not 
sufficient to require a change of venue 
except in the most extraordinary cases. In 
1
 Defendant does not appear to argue that the jury in his case 
was actually prejudiced. Insofar as the argument in defendant's 
brief could be construed as such a challenge, the issue of actual 
prejudice was waived for appeal when defendant passed the jury 
for cause in the trial court. 
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the usual situation, the movant must at least 
make a showing that the allegedly prejudicial 
material reached the veniremen, so that a 
foundation is laid for the possibility of 
actual bias." Northern California 
Pharmaceutical Association v. United States, 
306 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1962). 
648 P.2d at 89 (footnote omitted). In Codianna v. Morris, 660 
P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), the Court similarly observed: 
An accused can be denied a fair trial 
where the process of news-gathering is 
allowed such a free rein that it intrudes 
into every aspect of a trial and creates a 
"carnival atmosphere" and where the publicity 
is so weighted against the defendant and so 
extreme in its impact that members of the 
jury are encouraged to form strong 
preconceived views of his guilt. Sheppard v. 
Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 
1519, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Nevertheless, 
"pretrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse 
publicity—does not inevitably lead to an 
unfair trial." Nebraska Press Association v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 
2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). 
660 P.2d at 1111. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial 
court was obligated to order a change of venue in light of this 
case law. He offers nothing to indicate that his case is 
significantly different from two recent cases decided by the Utah 
Supreme Court—State v. Bishop. 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 18-19, 
P-2d , (1988); State v. Lafferty. 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 
63, P.2d , (1988)—where the trial courts' refusals to 
order a change of venue were upheld. 
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POINT II 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE A UTAH R. 
EVID. 406 OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE 
AMMUNITION EVIDENCE AT TRIAL, THE COURT 
SHOULD NOT CONSIDER HIS RULE 406 ARGUMENT ON 
APPEAL; FURTHERMORE, THE TRIAL COURT'S 
REFUSAL TO EXCLUDE THAT EVIDENCE UNDER UTAH 
R. EVID. 401 AND 403 SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Defendant argues that the trial court admitted the 
evidence of defendant's previous use of "snake shot" ammunition 
in violation of Utah R. Evid. 406 which relates to habit or 
routine practice. However, defendant did not make a Rule 406 
objection to that evidence at trial. His only objection to the 
challenged evidence was that it was "too far removed in time and 
too prejudicial" (Transcr. of May 8, 1987 proceedings at 62-63). 
The detailed Rule 406 analysis defendant presents on appeal was 
never presented to the trial court. Effectively, defendant made 
only a Utah R. Evid. 401 relevance objection and a Utah R. Evid. 
403 objection. Having failed to make a specific Rule 406 
objection below, defendant may not raise that objection and have 
it considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Loe» 732 
P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Evid. 103(a)(1). See also 
State v. Davis. 689 P.2d 5, 14 (Utah 1984) (a defendant must have 
specifically stated to the trial court the same grounds for 
objection to evidence presented on appeal). And, as for the 
trial court's rejection of defendant's relevancy and prejudice 
objections, defendant fails to demonstrate that there are grounds 
for reversal. It is well settled that "the trial court's ruling 
on the admissibility of evidence will not be reversed absent a 
showing that the trial court so abused its discretion as to 
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create a likelihood that injustice resulted." State v. Royball, 
710 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1985). See also State v. Mildenhall, 747 
P.2d 422, 425 (Utah 1987); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). No such abuse 
is apparent here. 
POINT III 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY AND 
PROPERLY OBJECT TO AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-11 ( ), BY THE 
TRIAL JUDGE, THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
THIS ALLEGATION ON APPEAL. 
Defendant argues that he was unduly prejudiced when the 
jury, during its deliberations, was permitted to adjourn for 
lunch in the absence of the officer sworn to keep them together 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-17-11 U?*Z). However, defendant 
waived this objection by failing to object to this alleged 
impropriety at trial. The issue is instead raised for the first 
time on appeal. "In the absence of exceptional circumstances, 
this Court has long refused to review matters raised for the 
first time on appeal where no timely and proper objection was 
made in the trial court." State v. Stegqell, 660 P.2d 252, 254 
(Utah 1983). Defendant fails to show any exceptional 
circumstances that would give rise for a review of this matter on 
appeal. Indeed, the trial court's strict instructions to the 
jury "not to discuss the case with anyone, draw conclusions, or 
read any newspapers or articles," (R. 83), safeguarded against 
any likelihood of prejudicial exposure. 
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POINT IV 
THE STATE'S INFORMATION CLEARLY NOTIFIED 
DEFENDANT OF ITS INTENTION TO RELY ON THE 
FIREARMS ENHANCEMENT PROVISION OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. S 76-3-203(2) (1983, as amended). 
Defendant argues that the State's information failed to 
notify him adequately of its intention to rely on the firearms 
enhancement provision of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203(2). Defendant 
points out that the charging portion of the information contains 
no allegations regarding the use of a firearm and does not cite 
or refer to the statute. This failure, concludes defendant, 
violates fundamental fairness and due process of law under State 
v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978). 
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) is 
dispositive of defendant's argument. Schreuder found that the 
State's information provided defendant adequate notice of the 
State's intention to rely on the firearms enhancement statute, 
where, even though the charging portion of the information 
contained no allegation regarding use of a firearm and did not 
cite or refer to the statute, the probable cause statement which 
was made part of the information stated that the victim "was shot 
in the back and in the head by a weapon, determined to be a .357 
magnum." !£. at 272. Schreuder relied on section 77-35-4(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that an 
"information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of 
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the 
offense charged where appropriate." 
In light of Schreuder. defendant's argument in this 
case is without merit. The probable cause statement, which is 
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found immediately below the information containing the statutory 
charge of attempted criminal homicide, gives clear notice that 
the attempt was committed with a deadly weapon. Sentences 1-6, 
8, 10, 20 and 21 of the probable cause statement all pertain to a 
•shooting" or "shots" committed by defendant or a "bullet" and 
that the caliber of the bullet was probably a .38 or .357 (R. 60-
64). Consequently, this written notice on the face of the 
information that the state intended to show a crime was committed 
with the use of a firearm satisfies the requirements of Angus and 
constitutional due process. Schreuder at 273. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /5iA day of April, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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